Associative Schemes — the legal tool against asymmetry
The power to form alliances has existed since 2008; the administrative asymmetry against Claro and Liberty is a mechanism with dates and amounts; and the Comptroller General drew the tool’s boundary on July 28, 2026.
Tags: ICE, Telecom, 5G, Costa Rica, Comptroller, Strategic Alliances, Regulation
A brief for the Board of Grupo ICE. The power to form alliances has existed since 2008; the administrative asymmetry against Claro and Liberty is a mechanism with dates and amounts; and the Comptroller General drew the tool’s boundary on July 28, 2026.
Deep Sight Brief · Season 1 · Issue 03 · August 4, 2026 · Data cut-off 2026-08-04 · English
Foreword — From the Deep Sight desk
This brief answers a single question, and answers it first: what can Grupo ICE do today that requires waiting for no one? Not the list of regulatory grievances — the tool already in its hand.
Every figure was verified against live sources as of August 4, 2026: the text of Law 8660 and its regulation, the Comptroller General’s orders of July 28, the July 9 ruling on the 5G award, and the economic and sector press of the period. Where the data is official we mark it ✓; where it is an estimate or sources diverge, ◐; where confirmation is missing, ◯. The reader keeps the wheel; we read the road.
ver profundo. Deep Sight Consulting · San José, Costa Rica
✓ verified · ◐ estimated / divergent · ◯ pending confirmation
01 — Executive Summary: the answer, first
Associative schemes and strategic alliances become critically relevant for Grupo ICE in a market where the two private operators already hold 1.6 million 5G lines ✓ and the group holds none. The thesis rests on three verified anchors.
First: the power already exists. Articles 6 and 8 of Law 8660 have granted it since August 2008 ✓, with ICE’s own implementing regulation since July 2017 ✓. Nothing needs to be legislated to begin.
Second: the asymmetry is a mechanism, not an adjective. It has dates and amounts. Claro and Liberty negotiate directly and confidentially; every significant ICE purchase goes through competitive tender, admits objections from its own competitors, and remains subject to the binding control of the Comptroller General.
Third: the tool’s boundary has just been drawn. On July 28, 2026 the Comptroller ordered a specific use of business associations to cease ✓. That boundary decides which alliance survives endorsement and which does not.
| Indicator | Reading |
|---|---|
| 1.6 M | 5G lines held by private operators; ICE still does not sell the service ✓ |
| 18 years | since Law 8660 enabled strategic alliances ✓ |
| 65–88% | share of the benefit retained by private partners in the agreements the Comptroller objected to ✓ |
| ~Oct 2026 | estimated expiry of the group’s spectrum exclusion ◐ |
The takeaway. The power is not the advantage; the discipline with which it is used is. Designing the alliance to pass the exam the Comptroller has just published is what separates new capability from an annulled file.
I — The asymmetry is a mechanism with dates and amounts
Claro and Liberty negotiate with their suppliers directly and confidentially. Every significant ICE purchase, by contrast, goes through competitive tender, admits objections from its own competitors, and remains subject to the binding control of the Comptroller General. The difference is not in the technical capacity of the parties but in the procedure each must walk to sign.
The cost of that walk was measured this very year. The group awarded its mass 5G network to the Ericsson consortium in April, in a deal exceeding US$220 million with a projected 12-month rollout ✓. On July 9 the Comptroller upheld the core and radio base stations at US$97.8 million, and in the same act annulled the award of the transport network won by Coasin ✓. Without backhaul, radio base stations have no way to return traffic: kölbi’s mass rollout slipped to 2027 ◐.
While that file is re-evaluated, Claro reports 1.3 million active 5G lines as of April 2026 ✓ and Liberty maintains its nationwide standalone coverage target for 2026 ✓. The spectrum exclusion weighing on the group expires around October 2026, on the 36-month count from notification of the sanction ◐. Both clocks run at once, and only one depends on ICE.
Exhibit 01 — The 2026 clock, fact by fact
| Fact | Date | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| Mass 5G network awarded to Ericsson, over US$220 M, Open RAN standalone | Apr 28, 2026 ✓ | rollout projected at 12 months |
| Comptroller upholds core and radio bases (US$97.8 M) and annuls Coasin’s backhaul | Jul 9, 2026 ✓ | without transport, radio bases carry no traffic |
| kölbi mass commercial rollout | 2027 ◐ | slipped by the annulment of lines 4 through 6 |
| Claro 1.3 M + Liberty 300 K 5G lines | Apr 2026 ✓ | ICE still does not sell the service |
| Expiry of the group’s spectrum exclusion | ~Oct 2026 ◐ | 36 months from notification of the sanction |
✓ official dates and amounts · ◐ estimate with divergence across sources
The price of asymmetry is not charged in tariff: it is charged in calendar.
A precision that changes the argument. It is often repeated that ICE fell under the General Public Procurement Act. That is no longer accurate: Constitutional Chamber ruling 2024-22483, published on August 13, 2024, annulled article 135(c) of Law 9986 and reinstated the special procurement regime of Law 8660 for the electricity and telecommunications businesses, on grounds of compatibility with CAFTA-DR commitments ✓. The asymmetry survives regardless, because external control — endorsement and objections before the Comptroller — does not depend on which procurement law applies. It was that control, not the general law, that annulled the backhaul ✓.
The takeaway. The obstacle is not the procurement law in force: it is external control over every significant award. Changing the law does not remove it; changing the instrument legitimately can route around it.
II — The power has existed since 2008, and the group already uses it
The legal basis need not be invented: it has been written for 18 years ✓. Article 8 of Law 8660, of August 2008, authorizes ICE and its companies to enter strategic alliances, inside and outside the country, or any other form of business association with public or private entities, domestic or foreign, for investment, commercial, research, technology-development, and service-provision activities ✓. Article 6 adds cooperation agreements and covenants as ordinary means of operation ✓. The institute issued the implementing regulation on July 17, 2017, and CNFL followed in October of the same year ✓.
Two figures, not synonyms. A business association is the union of ICE or its companies with one or more natural or legal persons, public or private, to develop a specific service or business, seeking competitive advantages unattainable separately. A strategic alliance is the variant with competing or potentially competing companies, to strengthen current markets or enter new ones ✓. The first distributes capabilities; the second also manages the tension of allying with a rival.
The practice need not be invented either. RACSA lit the country’s first standalone 5G network, and today its fixed 5G Internet is sold through channels across the entire conglomerate: kölbi stores, CNFL branches, and a network of private resellers, operating since March 2025 ✓. It is an associative scheme already working inside the group, with roles split between network, brand, and distribution.
The comparable case on the private side is Liberty’s alliance with Ericsson: contract signed in June 2025, US$100 million in investment financed by IDB Invest, and a nationwide standalone coverage target for 2026 ✓. The agility the group’s internal document asks to emulate already operates in the same market, with the same vendor ICE contracted.
Exhibit 02 — Where the power comes from ✓
| Instrument | Date | What it enables |
|---|---|---|
| Law 8660, art. 8 | Aug 8, 2008 | strategic alliances and any other form of business association, inside and outside the country |
| Law 8660, art. 6 | Aug 8, 2008 | cooperation agreements and covenants as an ordinary means of operation |
| ICE regulation | Jul 17, 2017 | defines business association and strategic alliance under art. 8 |
| CNFL regulation | Oct 10, 2017 | replicates the framework for the distribution company |
| Constitutional Chamber ruling 2024-22483 | Aug 13, 2024 | reinstates the special procurement regime of Law 8660 |
✓ official sources: statutory text, published regulations, and the constitutional ruling
The takeaway. There is no pending reform to wait for. There is a tool in force, regulated, and already proven inside the conglomerate itself.
III — The boundary the Comptroller drew on July 28
A week before this brief’s cut-off, the Comptroller General issued orders DFOE-CIU-ORD-00002-2026 and DFOE-CIU-ORD-00003-2026: ICE must cease using business associations with private companies as a vehicle to execute direct contracts between public entities ✓.
The central finding concerns distribution and execution. In the agreements examined, private partners received between 65% and 88% of the economic benefit, and substantive execution of the service was transferred to the partner, when the direct-contracting figure requires the institute to execute the principal part itself ✓. In several agreements the audit body also documented losses for the institute ✓.
The correct reading is not that the tool was banned. The law enables the alliance that creates capability and opens markets; what the Comptroller closed is the alliance used so a third party executes, under ICE’s signature, a contract the State awarded to ICE precisely because it is ICE. The same noun names two different figures, and the difference is measured in who executes and who retains the benefit.
Exhibit 03 — Two uses of the same instrument
Figures per Law 8660 and its regulation ✓ · findings from orders DFOE-CIU-ORD-00002/00003-2026 ✓. The 65%–88% range is the benefit split documented by the Comptroller in the agreements examined; the own-execution rule applies to direct contracting between public entities.
The law enables creating capability. What the Comptroller closed was lending the signature.
The takeaway. The endorsement question is always the same: who executes the substantive part, and who retains the benefit? An alliance that answers that in writing, from design, is defensible. One that leaves it implicit is not.
IV — The catalogue already proven abroad
Someone else’s capacity instead of an owned asset. Telefónica México returned its entire spectrum holding to the regulator on June 30, 2022, over the annual cost of the bands, and moved to operate on AT&T’s network under a 3G, 4G, and 5G capacity agreement ✓, later extended through 2030 ✓. For an operator with no low band and a spectrum exclusion running out, the model shows that access can be contracted while the asset is resolved.
Rural coverage through a public-private alliance. The Xunta de Galicia invested 10.6 million euros and Vodafone built 68 base stations serving 210 rural settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants, per the January 28, 2026 release ✓. Public funds pay for unprofitable infrastructure and the operator runs it: the same logic FONATEL and coverage obligations already administer here.
Wholesale network with resellers. The group already practices this internally: RACSA provides the network while kölbi, CNFL, and private resellers provide distribution ✓. The full version of the model, proven by neutral operators across the region, adds wholesale to third parties outside the conglomerate — competitors included.
Exhibit 04 — Three figures, three different problems
| Figure | Reference case | Verified figures | What it solves for the group |
|---|---|---|---|
| Someone else’s capacity instead of an owned asset | Telefónica México on AT&T’s network | full spectrum return Jun 30, 2022 ✓; agreement extended to 2030 ✓ | commercial access while spectrum stays blocked |
| Rural coverage through a public-private alliance | Xunta de Galicia + Vodafone | EUR 10.6 M, 68 stations, 210 settlements, over 5,000 inhabitants ✓ | coverage obligations without carrying the full capex |
| Wholesale network with resellers | RACSA + kölbi, CNFL, and private channels | country’s first standalone 5G network, live since Mar 2025 ✓ | monetize installed network through channels that already exist |
✓ official figures from each operator or administration · the Costa Rican fit of each figure is Deep Sight analysis ◐
The condition running through all three comes from the previous section: each survives endorsement only if the benefit split and substantive execution are documented from the design stage ◐, because that is precisely the exam the Comptroller has just applied ✓.
The takeaway. The catalogue does not need inventing: it needs choosing. And choosing means deciding, before signing, what ICE executes itself in each figure.
V — Close: the question that orders the session
Every regulatory window has a date. This one has two: the estimated expiry of the spectrum exclusion around October 2026 ◐ and the backhaul re-evaluation the Comptroller ordered on July 9 ✓. The question that orders the Board session is a single one:
When the spectrum exclusion expires, does the group arrive with a structured alliance able to pass the exam the Comptroller has just published, or with another award any competitor can object to?
The questions that open the right conversation, today:
- In every current or planned alliance, what substantive part does ICE execute itself — and is it in writing? ◯
- What benefit split is agreed, and how does it compare with the 65%–88% range the Comptroller objected to? ◯
- Will the re-awarded backhaul follow the tender route, or does it admit an associative vehicle? ◯
- What concrete capacity would be contracted from a third party while spectrum stays blocked? ◯
- Which coverage obligations could be met under the Xunta–Vodafone model with funds that already exist? ◯
- Is the group willing to wholesale its network to a competitor, which is where the neutral model truly pays? ◯
Pending verification at this brief’s cut-off. This issue cannot yet assert: whether ICE appealed orders DFOE-CIU-ORD-00002-2026 and DFOE-CIU-ORD-00003-2026 ◯; which contractual vehicle the backhaul re-award will use, with no published act at cut-off ◯; nor the figure for the industrial 5G IoT device base relative to what is available on 4G, with no independent source located ◯.
The takeaway. The power has existed since 2008 and the market is not waiting. What decides the outcome is not asking for a new tool: it is using the one already there, with the discipline July’s exam put in writing.
References
- Law 8660 — Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica, August 8, 2008. Strengthening and Modernization of Public Entities in the Telecommunications Sector, arts. 6 and 8. Official text ✓
- ICE Regulation 2017 — Regulation on strategic alliances and other forms of business association, July 17, 2017; CNFL regulation of October 10, 2017. Record ✓
- Ruling 2024-22483 — Delfino.cr, August 13, 2024. Constitutional Chamber excludes ICE from the General Public Procurement Act and reinstates the special regime of Law 8660. Report ✓
- CGR orders 2026 — SURCOS Digital, July 28, 2026. DFOE-CIU-ORD-00002-2026 and DFOE-CIU-ORD-00003-2026: cease using business alliances to execute direct contracts between public entities. Report ✓
- Documented losses — El Observador, 2026. Detail of partners and public counterparties in the agreements examined by the Comptroller. Report ✓
- 5G market — CR Hoy, April 16, 2026. Private operators reach 1.6 million 5G lines while ICE does not sell the service. Report ✓
- Ericsson award — Infobae, May 1, 2026. Award of April 28, Open RAN standalone, over US$220 million. Report ✓
- Backhaul annulment — El Financiero, July 2026. July 9 ruling: lines 1 through 3 upheld at US$97.8 million; lines 4 through 6 annulled with an order to re-evaluate. Report ✓
- RACSA and kölbi — Delfino.cr, March 2025. kölbi sells RACSA’s fixed 5G Internet to homes and businesses. Report ✓
- Sales channels — RACSA, 2025. ICE and kölbi stores, CNFL branches, and private distributors. Report ✓
- Telefónica on AT&T — Infobae, April 2, 2022. Full spectrum return to the IFT on June 30, 2022, and operation on AT&T’s network. Report ✓
- Extension to 2030 — TeleSemana, April 29, 2024. AT&T and Movistar México extend the capacity agreement to the end of the decade. Report ✓
- Xunta and Vodafone — Vodafone Spain press room, January 28, 2026. Public investment of 10.6 million euros, 68 stations across 48 municipalities, 210 rural settlements. Report ✓
- Deep Sight literature note — “5G in Costa Rica — State of the business 2026,” August 4, 2026. Verification run with 47 claims checked; supports the slip to 2027, the Liberty–Ericsson alliance, and the market figures ✓
- Deep Sight verification note — “Telecom CR — ICE associative schemes,” August 4, 2026. Per-claim verdicts for this run, including the spectrum-exclusion expiry calculation ✓
Editorial note
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Deep Sight Brief · Season 1 · Issue 03 · Verified against live sources 2026-08-04